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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF TREE PARITY MACHINE SYNCHRONIZATION TIME* 
В статье рассмотрены особенности архитектуры и принципы взаимодействия двух искусст-
венных нейронных сетей. Состояние синхронизации сетей позволяет использовать соответст-
вующую информацию в качестве ключа для дальнейшего шифрования сообщений. С помощью 
специально разработанного программного средства собраны и обработаны обширные статисти-
ческие данные о времени синхронизации сетей.  
The article describes the features of architecture and the principles of interaction of two (artificial 
neural networks. Synchronization status of networks allows to use the relevant information as a key to 
encrypt further communications. With the help of specially developed software tools the extensive 
statistical data on the networks synchronization time are collected and processed. 
Introduction. Public-key cryptography is based 
on computationally hard problems, for which no effi-
cient solving algorithm is known. Although efficient 
solving algorithm is not known, a development of 
computing power and the development of technolo-
gies allowing the cloud computing or the use of large 
botnet, allows to try to brute attacks. As the response 
to this development we observe constant increasing 
the length of keys used in cryptographic algorithm to 
the size which are considered as a safe one, but this 
also increases the time needed to encrypt and decrypt 
messages. An alternative approach is the search for a 
new methods of cryptography, which does not rely 
on computationally hard problems. Interesting are the 
attempts to apply artificial intelligence methods in 
cryptography, which review can be found in Ibra him 
and Maarof [1]. One of the proposals is to use artifi-
cial neural networks to exchange the cryptographic 
keys for partner's further communication using open 
communication channel. 
The research of the learning of artificial neural 
networks in the variant with the teacher led to the 
discovery of interesting phenomena which is the 
synchronization of these networks [2]. Network 
learning process requires the use of training set, 
which consists of pairs of input impulses – vector x 
and the expected response to the network, which can 
be single number or vector y. The network learning 
consists in the choice of weights, for which the net-
work response will be the same as expected by the 
teacher, in other words learning process consists on 
minimization of network's error. A particularly in-
teresting is possibility of modifying the training set 
during network's learning. In particular, the training 
set can be generated by another neural network. In 
this case, the learned network mimics teachers one, 
becoming at the end of learning a copy of teacher's 
network. However, if the networks will swap their 
roles and they will be for each other teacher and stu-
dent, we will observe synchronization between 
them, after which both of the networks will have the 
same weight vectors. Synchronizing  
networks have influence on each other by modifying 
the training set, so that the synchronization process 
is faster than passive learning of the network [3]. 
This difference in time required to achieve compati-
ble weight vector by a third party is the foundation 
for the use of network synchronization in cryptogra-
phy [4, 5]. In application are used a small neural 
networks with one hidden layer, which is called a 
TPM (Tree Parity Machine). Fig. 1 presents typical 
TPM, where K – number of perceptrons, N – num-
ber of input impulses for each perceptron and L the 
maximum absolute value of weight [6]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Tree Parity Machine 
 
Proposing a new approach to cryptographic key 
exchange resulted with attempts to attack synchro-
nizing networks. The analysis of neural cryptography 
with three methods of a successful attack presented 
Kiimov, Mityagin and Shamir [7], who described the 
genetic, geometric and probabilistic attack. But as 
pointed out Ruttor [8], the probability of synchroni-
zation of attacker's network decreases exponentially 
with increasing values of weights, so with little cost 
we can achieve desired safety level. Another possi-
bility of strengthening the safety of the cryptosystem 
based on synchronization of the networks is to expand 
the numbers field in which the TPMs operate to the 
Complex numbers, Quaternions and Octonions [9]. 
With these methods, the key exchange protocol using 
artificial neural networks is a relatively safe option. 
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Objectives. Two partners A and В during syn-
chronization of their networks have access only to 
their own network's weight vector, actually gener-
ated vector of input impulses and the results of the 
both networks. Input impulses and results of the 
networks are transmitted with an open channel, 
while the weights vectors of the networks are 
known only to their owners, so partners does not 
know the weights of the other one network. Most 
essential problem is determining the point, at which 
both networks are already synchronized, that is, they 
have the same weight vectors. This is particularly 
important for communications safety. The more pre-
cisely you can specify this point of time, the faster 
you can finish network synchronization making it 
difficult to attack by a third party. Weight values 
obtained from the synchronization can be used as a 
cryptographic key for further communication. The 
purpose of this research was to analyze the synchro-
nization of TPM with different parameters and spec-
ify the synchronization time and its dependence of 
the network structure. The time required to synchro-
nize the network was defined by number of cycles, 
which consisted of: generating a input impulses, 
the calculating of output values for the network, 
sending the output to other networks and learning 
networks based on the common input impulses and 
output the second network. There were tested net-
works with different number of neurons and differ-
ent number of input signals. In addition, the differ-
ent weights intervals were analyzed. 
Methodology. Analyzes of neural nets synch-
ronization was carried out on two networks run-
ning on one computer. Networks exchange only 
their results for the given input vector. As in syn-
chronization with the open communication chan-
nel, none of the networks have access to the weight 
vector of the other network. The simulation pro-
gram was checking after each step of synch-
ronization if the weight vectors are identical and if 
they were, the simulation results were saved. Based 
on the synchronization results, statistical analyzes 
have been made using a spreadsheet. 
Synchronization of TPM network on structures 
K-N-L, and K ∈ [3; 10], N ∈ [4; 20] and L ∈ [5; 50] 
were simslated. Each pair of network was synch-
ronized 1000 times. The results for a network of 
three neurons with four input impulses each are 
presented below. TPM on this structure is com-
monly used in neural cryptography. 
Results. The simulations allowed to obtain for 
each network a similar histogram, which shows the 
number of networks that synchronized after a 
specified number of cycles. This histogram is simi-
lar to the histograms published in [2]. As can be 
seen most of the network synchronized in less than 
half of the longest observed time. The chart below 
(Fig. 2) shows the histogram for the network pa-
rameters 3-4-5 (3 perceptrons with 4 inputs each, 
weights belongs to the interval [–5; 5]). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Histogram presenting frequencies  
of synchronization of TPMs 
 
For fixed number of perceptrons and the input 
impulses, the synchronization time increases pro-
portional to the square of the maximum weight 
value, which is consistent with the Ruttor’s et al. 
results [8]. The Table shows results of simulations 
for networks with three perceptrons, each with four 
input impulses, the weights value L ∈ [5; 50], 
which corresponds to the system size m = 2L + 1 in 
the range 11 to 101. 
 
Results of TPM synchronization 
TPM  
structure 
Average  
synchronization time 
Standard  
deviation 
Standard deviation
 (percentage)  
Three 
quartile 
Four 
quartile 
Three quartile 
(percentage) 
3-4-5 143,56 44,32 31% 172 328 52% 
3-4-10 542,55 159,05 29% 635 1 283 49% 
3-4-15 1 186,27 371,64 31% 1 386 3 714 37% 
3-4-20 2 102,10 638,35 30% 2 475 4 830 51% 
3-4-25 3 225,09 930,56 29% 3 740 7 501 50% 
3-4-30 4 638,31 1 355,53 29% 5 416 11 181 48% 
3-4-35 6 126,56 1 669,13 27% 7 136 13 979 51% 
3-4-40 7 788,00 2 164,67 28% 9 077 19 763 46% 
3-4-45 9 549,42 2 901,80 30% 10 818 26 228 41% 
3-4-50 12 722,68 3 791,36 30% 14 921 34 561 43% 
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The table contains the average synchronization 
time measured in cycles, standard deviation and 
quartiles. As can be seen the deviation of the syn-
chronization time is close to 30% and does not de-
pend on the size m, but the most interesting result. 
It is the comparison three and four (maximum 
value) quartile. The average value of three quartile 
is about 50% of the longest observed synchroniza-
tion time, which means that 75% of the network 
synchronizes in half the time than the worst of the 
analyzed network and it not depends on the weight 
maximum absolute value. 
The Synchronization time in cycles depen-
dence of the weights maximum absolute value 
grows with the square of the maximum weight 
value, as can be seen in the chart below. 
The same consistency can be observed for net-
works with other structures. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Dependency of synchronization time  
on weight max absolute value:  
1 – average; 2 – three quartile;  
3 – maximal observed (four quartile)  
 
Conclusions. The simulations shows that the 
average network synchronization time grows pro-
portionally to the maximum weight value, while the 
standard deviation is about 30% of the average time. 
Statistical analysis of the learning process indi-
cates that the 75% of the network synchronizes in 
half the longest observed time. It follows that for 
any network there is a number of steps, which usu-
ally allows to synchronize networks, and when the 
synchronization process is continued for more steps 
it can be potentially danger by giving attacker 
 
a longer time for a successful synchronization of 
his network. The number of steps, after which net-
works should be synchronization can be deter-
mined by the three quartile, (as v example for TPM 
with structure 3-4-10 this will be 635 cycles and 
for TPM 3-4-40 networks should be synchronized 
after 9077 cycles).  
If the networks are not synchronized after this 
number of cycles, the process should be started all 
over again with random values of weights to im-
prove safety of this system. 
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